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Cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future
Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari *

Abstract
We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies
populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve full
efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions for
monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally, what classes of strategies
do subjects employ?

We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even in

anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment institutions
significantly promote cooperation; and, third, subjects mostly emply strategies that
are selective in punishment.
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Despite its relevance to macro and microeconomics, there are few experimental studies on
strategic behavior in long-term relationships with uncertain endings (e.g., Tom R. Palfrey and
Howard Rosenthal, 1994; Masaki Aoyagi and Guillaume Frechette, 2005; Pedro Dal Bó, 2005;

John Duffy and Jack Ochs, 2006). This paper fills the gap by studying economies where subjects
repeatedly interact in pairs formed at random, and the economy has an indefinite duration, i.e.,
infinitely repeated (matching) games. Such an approach is of general interest for two reasons.
First, the underlying theoretical platform is widely used in economics. Infinitely repeated
games with random matching of anonymous agents have been employed in macroeconomics to
model trading frictions (Peter Diamond, 1982), to analyze labor markets and equilibrium
unemployment (Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides, 1994), and in monetary economics
to make explicit obstacles to credit arrangements (Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Randall Wright, 1989).
In microeconomics, similar models have been used to study the emergence of social norms in
anonymous societies (Michihiro Kandori, 1992, Glenn Ellison, 1994), the organization of
commerce (Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, 1990), and economic
governance (Avinash Dixit, 2003). Empirical studies of infinitely repeated games focus
overwhelmingly on interactions in stable pairs of partners (Aoyagi and Frechette, 2005; Dal Bó,
2005, Jim Engle-Warnick and Robert L. Slonim, 2004, 2006) and not on interactions among
randomly matched, anonymous agents. Instead, we investigate which institutions are
behaviorally associated to the emergence, sustainability, and breakdown of cooperation in
anonymous economies.
Second, random matching models are richer than fixed matching model in terms of the set of
strategies that can be adopted. In general, models based on indefinitely repeated games have
multiple equilibria. Agents wanting to support a cooperative outcome face a double challenge:
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not only must they be able to coordinate on an outcome, but must also coordinate on a credible
threat that can support uninterrupted long-run cooperation. The above models assume, often
implicitly, that self-interested agents will select the most efficient among the available equilibria.
While convenient, equilibrium selection criteria based on efficiency have no solid foundations
either in theoretical or in empirical arguments. To identify an equilibrium selection criterion it is
crucial to understand what strategies agents adopt. While the vast majority of experimental
studies on indefinitely repeated games concern fixed pairs of subjects, a random matching design
allows for a richer set of strategies and it is better suited to isolate behavioral components in
strategy selection. The data from our experimental economies demonstrate, for instance, that
subjects have “preferences” over strategies, and this crucially influences the outcome selected. In
designs that are identical except for the classes of strategies available, we find that outcomes can
differ considerably in terms of cooperation level because of a reluctance to use some classes of
strategies, despite their theoretical effectiveness.
In our experiment we simplify as much as possible the coordination task by designing
economies of four agents. Each period they are randomly paired to play a prisoners’ dilemma.
The economy has an indefinite duration, based on a probabilistic continuation rule. The
theoretical foundation for this design can be traced back to the folk theorems for infinitely
repeated games (supergames) of James W. Friedman (1971), and the subsequent randommatching extensions in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). The basic theoretical result is that
cooperation is an equilibrium when agents are involved in a long-term interaction, are
sufficiently patient, and have sufficient information on the actions of others. This result is very
powerful and it extends even to anonymous economies where action histories are private
information. Parameters in the experiment are set to ensure that the efficient outcome can be
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sustained as one of the possible equilibria, when agents adopt the following simple social norm.
Every agent cooperates unless someone has been caught defecting, in which case those who see
the defection should forever defect (“grim trigger” strategy). In practice, however, achieving the
efficient outcome may be problematic because subjects in the experiment are not in a stable
partnership, cannot communicate their intentions to others, and can neither commit to nor
enforce cooperation. We study the effect of various levels of information about action histories
and the punishment technologies that are made available to subjects.
Our study revolves around the following research questions: first, can strangers who interact
indefinitely achieve substantial levels of cooperation and efficiency? Strangers are anonymous
subjects who are randomly matched in each period and their histories are private information.
Second, which institutions for monitoring and enforcement promote cooperation? And, finally,
what classes of strategies are adopted in economies that achieve high efficiency?
Our results bring new insights in understanding long-term relationships in anonymous
economies. First, cooperation levels in our experimental economies are high and increasing with
experience, even when action histories are private information. The result is novel. Second, this
study sheds some light on the type of economic institutions that may facilitate the emergence of
norms of cooperation in experimental anonymous societies. For instance, not all monitoring
institutions promote cooperation. We report high cooperation levels in situations where subjects
know identities and histories of opponents, but not when they see aggregate outcomes without
observing identities. Moreover, costly personal punishment significantly promotes cooperation.
Under this institution subjects can pay a cost to inflict a loss on their opponent. The effect of this
institution has been studied in settings with finitely repeated interaction (Elinor Ostrom, James
Walker, and Roy Gardner, 1992, Ernst Fehr and Simon Gaechter, 2000), but not when interaction

3

is indefinitely repeated, which is when many informal equilibrium punishment strategies are also
available. Our work complements a growing economics literature devoted to uncover theoretical
links between the (un)availability of enforcement and punishment institutions on one side, and
patterns of exchange and cooperation on the other (e.g., Stefan Krasa and Anne Villamil, 2000,
Dixit, 2003, Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera and Daniela Puzzello, 2007). Finally,
subjects appear to have preferences for some classes of strategies. The average subject avoids
indiscriminate strategies, shows a strong tendency to defect with opponents who have “cheated”
her in the past, and tends to disregard information on the opponent’s behavior in other matches.
These findings help define an empirically-relevant criterion for equilibrium selection—one of the
unsolved questions of the theory of repeated games—using behavioral considerations.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I discusses the related literature; Section II presents
the experimental design; Section III provides a theoretical analysis; results are reported in
Section IV; and Section V concludes.
I. Related experimental literature
Our work builds on the experimental literature on infinitely repeated games (supergames).
Alvin E. Roth and Keith Murnighan (1978) were the first to implement infinitely repeated games
in an experiment by employing a probabilistic continuation rule, thus transforming it into an
indefinitely repeated game. Many experiments have followed this design (e.g., Duffy and Ochs,
1999, Aldo Rustichini and Anne Villamil, 2000) because for risk-neutral subjects a constant
continuation probability is theoretically equivalent to a constant time-discount rate and an
infinite horizon.
Several experiments have adopted probabilistic continuation rules to study the empirical
validity of folk theorems for supergames. A basic result is that subjects perceive the differences
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in the incentive structure of finitely repeated versus indefinitely repeated interaction, and react in
the expected direction. For example, Dal Bó (2005) reports lower cooperation for finite duration
experiments in comparison to indefinite duration with the same expected length; the higher the
discount rate the lower the cooperation. See also Hans-Theo Normann and Brian Wallace (2006).
The closest literature considers indefinitely repeated experiments whose stage game is a
prisoner’s dilemma (for other games see Tim Cason and Feisal Khan, 1999, Engle-Warnick and
Slonim, 2004, 2006, Engle-Warnick, 2007). Two aspects of these experiments are important: the
matching protocols and the availability of information about other subjects. Within a supergame,
subjects are matched either using a fixed or a random protocol. Since all experiments surveyed
include several supergames within a session, they also specify an additional protocol to match
the subjects after each supergame. We will come back to this point, later.
Most studies use a fixed matching protocol within a supergame; see Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1994), Aoyagi and Frechette (2005), or Dal Bó (2005). Under this design, referred to as
“partner”, subjects always interact with the same person and generally support a significant level
of cooperation, sometimes full cooperation. Instead, our study employs a random matching
protocol within a supergame as, for instance, in Steven Schwartz, Richard Young, and Kristina
Zvinakis (2000) and Duffy and Ochs (2006). In any given period subjects meet in pairs but after
each period matches are destroyed and new pairs are formed drawing subjects at random from
the entire economy. Duffy and Ochs (2006) found remarkably higher cooperation in fixed than in
random matching economies. Therefore, despite the theoretical viability of cooperative equilibria
with random matching and private monitoring, it seems they are empirically difficult to attain.
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A novel feature of our study is that it helps us understand which one of the several
available strategies that support a given equilibrium outcome have been employed.1 This issue
has been largely unexplored in the experimental literature on supergames, as it has mostly
focused on measuring the levels of cooperation; an exception is Engle-Warnick and Slonim
(2006). Our experimental design allows us to exploit differences in information across treatments
in order to change the strategy set and hence identify the type of strategies employed.
We also relate the choice of punishment strategy in an indefinitely repeated setting to the
literature on costly personal punishment in one-shot settings. Subjects in experimental studies of
finitely repeated social dilemmas have shown a surprising tendency to engage in costly personal
punishment of others, especially defectors. Though this behavior is inconsistent with personal
income maximization, it has been shown to be remarkably robust (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner,
1992; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, Marco Casari and Charles Plott, 2003).2 A third novel feature of
our study is to examine how this behavioral trait may be employed in sustaining the cooperative
equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, where there does already exist an (informal)
punishment technology. This design may be useful in isolating possible elements or economic
institutions that can facilitate selecting the cooperative equilibrium in a more general setting.
The matching protocol across supergames is also important because of possible contagion
effects. Indeed, to play a supergame in a session, there are several ways to partition a pool of
subjects into several economies. The way we ran multiple supergames is to ensure that any two
subjects were never assigned to the same economy for more than one supergame. A more

1

The strategies include off-equilibrium threats that are not carried out on the theoretical equilibrium path. The
features of these threats are irrelevant as long as they are credible and generate a sufficiently low continuation
payoff.
2
For example, Fehr and Gaechter (2000) consider a stranger matching model (a finite sequence of one-shot
interactions), and the intensity of punishment does not show any end game effect; punishment seems to be driven by
strong negative emotions.
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rigorous partitioning procedure is to avoid that anyone shares a common past opponent. Both
procedures control for contagion effects. 3 This contrasts with randomly re-matching the same set
of subjects in each period and after each supergame (e.g., Schwartz, Young and Zvinakis, 2000).

Private
monitoring

Private
monitoring
with punishment

Anonymous public
monitoring

Public monitoring
(non-anonymous)

Random

Random

Random

Random

Anonymity

No subject IDs

No subject IDs

No subject IDs

Subject IDs are
public

Information

Action of current
opponent

Action of current
opponent

History of all actions
taken in the economy
without IDs (no
individual histories)

Individual histories
of everyone in the
economy

Ways to punish

Only by defecting

Pay 5 (points) to
reduce opponent's
payoff by 10

Only by defecting

Only by defecting

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Matching protocol
within an economy

Available strategies:
- Global
(not selective)
- Reactive
(moderately selective)
- Targeted
(highly selective)
Session dates
Show-up fee
No. of periods

Yes

Yes
(^)

21.4.05
$5
71

7.9.05
$5
104

28.4.05
$5
139

Yes
6.9.05
0
99

27.4.05
0
129

1.9.05
0
125

12.4.05
0
86

8.9.05
0
128

Table 1: Experimental treatments4
3

In Dal Bó (2005) each subject plays three supergames. In each supergame of the “Dice” sessions N participants
are partitioned into N/2 two-person economies. The partitioning across supergames is such that a subject’s decisions
in a supergame could not affect the decisions of subjects met in future supergames. Ensuring the absence of
contagion effects in this manner requires very large session sizes (see the theory of anonymous matching procedures
in Aliprantis, Camera and Puzzello 2006, 2007). In our study each subject played five supergames. Subjects may
have shared a common past opponent in supergames three or later. Aoyagi and Frechette (2005) use a different in
between matching protocol; each agent plays G>10 supergames. In the first ten supergames they partition agents in a
round robin fashion and in the last (G-10) supergames they randomly re-matched participants.
(^)
One could interpret the possibility of personal punishment as a form of targeted strategy, although the personal
punishment reduces the continuation payoffs for the punisher more than with the reactive strategy. Personal
punishment expands the set of strategies. In particular it allows for a targeted strategy because an agent can punish
his opponent after observing the choice of his opponent.
4
For comparison purposes, note that a “partner” treatment (e.g., as in Dal Bó, 2005 or Duffy and Ochs, 2006) differs
from our treatments in the matching protocol (fixed pairings instead of random), may differ in Anonymity (subject
IDs may be public or not), and is otherwise identical to the Private Monitoring treatment in Information and Ways to
punish. Of course, with fixed pairings the distinction among targeted, reactive, and global strategies is irrelevant.
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II. Experimental design
This experiment has four treatments (Table 1) that differ in the amount of information or the
punishment options available to subjects. The stage game (Table 2), the continuation probability,
and matching protocols were identical across treatments. The efficient outcome can be supported
as an equilibrium in all treatments.
The stage game. The stage game is a standard prisoners’ dilemma with payoffs determined
according to Table 2.5 We call action Y cooperate and action Z defect. We say that there is
coordination on cooperation in the pair only if both subjects choose Y. So, we will define the
degree of coordination on cooperation in the economy according to how many pairs cooperate.
(A) Notation in the theoretical analysis
Player 1/
Player 2
Y
Z

(B) Parameterization of the experiment

Y

Z

y, y
h, l

l, h
z, z

Player 1/
Player 2
Cooperate (Y)
Defect (Z)

Cooperate
(Y)
25, 25
30, 5

Defect
(Z)
5, 30
10, 10

Table 2: The stage game

The supergame. A supergame (or cycle, as we will call it) consists of an indefinite interaction
among subjects achieved by a random continuation rule, as first introduced by Roth and
Mangham (1978). A supergame that has reached period t continues into t + 1 with a
probability δ ∈ (0, 1) , so the interaction is with probability one of finite but uncertain duration.
We interpret the continuation probability δ as the discount factor of a risk-neutral subject. The
expected duration of a supergame is 1/(1−δ) periods, and we set δ = 0.95, so in each period the
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We selected this parameterization as it scores high on the indexes proposed by Anatol Rapoport and Albert
Chammah (1965), Roth and Murnighan (1978), and Murnighan and Roth (1983) that correlate with the level of
cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma in a partner protocol. In Table 2 we have
0 ≤ l < z < y < h and 2 z < l + h < 2 y .
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supergame is expected to go on for 20 (additional) periods.6 In our experiment the computer
drew a random integer between 1 and 100, using a uniform distribution, and the supergame
terminated with a draw of 96 or of a higher number. All session participants observed the same
number, and so it could have also served as a public randomization device.
The experimental session. Each experimental session involved twenty subjects and exactly
five cycles. We built twenty-five economies in each session by creating five groups of four
subjects in each of the five cycles. This matching protocol across supergames was applied in a
predetermined, round-robin fashion. More precisely, in each cycle each economy included only
subjects who had neither been part of the same economy in previous cycles nor were part of the
same economy in future cycles. Subjects did not know how groups were created but were
informed that no two participants ever interacted together for more than one cycle.
Participants in an economy interacted in pairs according to the following matching protocol
within a supergame. At the beginning of each period of a cycle, the economy was randomly
divided into two pairs. There are three ways to pair the four subjects and each one was equally
likely, so a subject had one third probability of meeting any other subject in each period of a
cycle. For the whole duration of a cycle a subject interacted exclusively with the members of her
economy. By design, cycles for all economies terminated simultaneously.
Treatments. The experiment consisted of four different treatments that differed in the
availability of information and punishment options (Table 1).7 All treatments maintained the
same continuation probability, stage game parameters, and matching protocols. Two treatments
were characterized by private monitoring, i.e., subjects could observe actions and outcomes in
6
7

With continuation probability δ, the expected number of periods is S =

∑

∞
n =1

(1 − δ )δ n−1n = 1 /(1 − δ) .

Following a referee’s suggestion, we ran a fifth treatment under private monitoring with economies of 14 subjects
interacting for only one cycle. We ran 4 sessions at Purdue University drawing subjects from the same pool. On
average, a session lasted 40 minutes and paid $11.70 per person, including an $8 or $10 show-up fee.
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their pair, but not the identity of their opponent. One, denoted private monitoring, was the
benchmark case as in Kandori (1992). The other, denoted private monitoring with punishment,
added the possibility of personal punishment. Subjects could lower the earnings of their
opponent, at a cost, after having observed their opponent’s action. In order to do so, we added a
second stage to the one-shot game. The first stage was the prisoners’ dilemma in Table 2B. In the
second stage actions were revealed, and subjects had the opportunity to pay 5 points to reduce
the opponent's earnings by 10 points. No one could observe any of the actions outside their pair,
including the personal punishment. The remaining two treatments were characterized by public
monitoring, which simply means that every subject could observe the current actions taken in
every pair. In one treatment, denoted non-anonymous public monitoring, histories were
associated with identities of subjects.8 In the remaining treatment, denoted anonymous public
monitoring, subjects observed histories but not identities.
To summarize, the availability of information about actions in the economy was set at one of
three different degrees. First, subjects could be aware only of their own history (private
monitoring, private monitoring with punishment) or of the history of the entire economy.
Second, the history of the economy could be made available at an aggregate (anonymous public
monitoring) or individual level (non-anonymous public monitoring). The history of the economy
was provided at the aggregate level by listing everyone's actions in random order and without
identifiers. On the contrary in the non-anonymous public monitoring treatment, individual
histories were listed with the person's ID as label. This allowed a subject to inspect the
opponent’s actions in previous encounters with her as well as with others.
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In a finitely-repeated trust game experiment Iris Bohnet and Steffen Huck (2004) inform the trustor about her
trustee’s past behavior in each period. In our non-anonymous public monitoring treatment we provide information
about identities, actions and matching histories of everyone in the economy, not only of the current opponent.
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We recruited 160 subjects through announcements in undergraduate classes at Purdue
University and signed up online. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) at Purdue University. No eye contact was possible among
subjects, and copies of the instructions were on all desks. Instructions were read aloud. A copy of
the instructions is in the online supplementary material. Average earnings were $29.50 per
subject. A session lasted on average 110 periods for a running time of 2.5 hours, including
instruction reading and a quiz. Details about the number and length of sessions are provided in
Table 1 (each session had 20 participants and 5 cycles).

III. Theoretical predictions
We first introduce a theoretical framework for the private monitoring treatment based on
Kandori (1992) and then discuss the other treatments, in particular private monitoring with
punishment and public monitoring. The analysis is based on the assumption of identical players,
who are self-regarding and risk-neutral, in the absence of commitment and enforcement.9
An “economy” is composed of four players a, b, c, and d who interact for an indefinite
number of periods denoted t = 1,2,.... Participants are randomly paired to play the prisoners’
dilemma of Table 2. There are three ways to pair participants in an economy, {ab, cd}, {ac, bd},
or {ad, cb}, and in each period one pairing was randomly chosen with equal probability.10
III.A. Equilibrium in the stage game
Consider the stage game described in Table 2A, which is a prisoners’ dilemma. The players

9

The theoretical framework is one of a homogeneous population. An alternative is to consider subjects of different
types in the experiment as, for example, in Miguel Costa-Gomes, Vincent Crawford, and Bruno Broseta (2001) or
Paul J. Healy (2007). The assumption of identical risk-neutral players is, of course, open to question but it has been
retained since it is a useful abstraction
10
Strictly speaking, we are dealing with a game with varying opponents, since players are paired randomly at each
point in time. However, action sets and payoff functions are unchanging. Thus, we refer to it as a supergame,
following the experimental literature.
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simultaneously and independently select an action from the set {Y , Z } . We allow for mixed-

strategies. Let π ∈ [0,1] denote the probability that the representative player selects Y, and 1 − π
the probability that he selects Z. We use Π ∈ [0,1] to denote the given selection of the opponent.
The unique Nash equilibrium is defection, i.e. in equilibrium both players choose Z, the
minmax action, and earn z, the minmax payoff. The representative player’s payoff is simply his
expected utility, denoted U. This can be rearranged as:
(1)

U = z + Π (h − z ) − π [ Π (h − y ) + (1 − Π )( z − l )] .

The player maximizes U by choosing π, so can assure himself payoff z, independent of Π. Notice
that U is linear in π, and we have assumed y<h and l < z. It follows that the player’s best
response is to set π = 0, for any Π ≥ 0.
Since 2 z < l + h < 2 y , total surplus in the economy is maximized when everyone cooperates,
i.e. all players choose Y. Thus, we refer to the outcome where every player in the economy
selects Y as the efficient or fully cooperative outcome. If both pairs in the economy select {Z , Z } ,
then we say that the outcome is inefficient. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point in the players’
aggregate best response, so π = Π = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
III.B. Equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated game with private monitoring

Under private monitoring indefinite repetition of the stage game with randomly selected
opponents can expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. Following the work in Kandori (1992)
and Ellison (1994), here we present sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium set includes the
efficient outcome, which is achieved when everyone cooperates in every match and all periods.
The private monitoring treatment is characterized by two informational frictions. First,
players cannot observe identities of opponents, so we say that players are strangers. Second,
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players can neither communicate with each other nor observe action histories of others; they can
only observe the outcome resulting from actions taken in their pair.
The inefficient outcome can be supported as a sequential equilibrium using the strategy
“defect forever.” Since repeated play does not decrease the set of equilibrium payoffs, Z is
always a best response to play of Z by any randomly chosen opponent. In this case the payoff in
the indefinitely repeated game is the present discounted value of the minmax payoff, z/(1−δ).
If δ is sufficiently high, however, then the efficient outcome can be sustained as a sequential
equilibrium. Formally, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. Let δ * ∈(0,1) be the unique value of δ that satisfies
(2)

δ 2 (h − z ) + δ (2h − y − z ) − 3(h − y ) = 0 .

If δ ≥ δ *, then the efficient outcome can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium. In an economy
with full cooperation, every player receives payoff y /(1−δ).
The proof is in Camera and Casari (2007) and in the online supplementary material, and
follows that found in Kandori (1992). Here, we provide intuition. Conjecture that players behave
according to actions prescribed by a social norm; a social norm is simply a rule of behavior that
identifies “desirable” play and a sanction to be selected if a departure from the desirable action is
observed. We identify the desirable action by Y and the sanction by Z. Thus, every player must
cooperate as long as she has never played Z or has seen anyone select Z. However, as soon as a
player observes Z, then she must select Z forever after. This is known as a grim trigger strategy.
In our experiments, this strategy is called a reactive strategy, i.e., a player will choose Z if and
only if his opponent has chosen Z.
Given this social norm, on the equilibrium path everyone cooperates so the payoff to
everyone is the present discounted value of y forever: y/(1−δ). A complication arises when a
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player might want to defect since h > y . Hence, since z<y it must be the threat of minmax
forever that deters a player from defecting. Notice that a player deviates in several instances—
first, in equilibrium, if she has not observed play of Z in the past but chooses Z currently, and
second, off-equilibrium, if she has observed play of Z in the past but plays Y currently.

100%

One agent deviates in period k

90%

Fraction of cooperation
in the economy

80%
70%
60%
Reactive strategy

50%
40%

Global strategy

30%

Targeted strategy

20%
10%
0%

Realized
←⎯

Expected
⎯→

k-1

k+1 k+2 k+3

k

k+4

k+5 k+6

k+7

period

Figure 1: Dynamic reaction to a defection in an economy

Consider one-time deviations by a single player. It should be clear that cooperating when no
defection has ever been observed is optimal only if the agent is sufficiently patient. The future
reward from cooperating today must be greater than the extra utility generated by defecting today
(unimprovability criterion). Instead, if a defection occurs and everyone plays according to the
social norm, then everyone ends up defecting since the initial defection will spread by contagion.
Given that the economy has only four players, this contagion in our experimental economies
should occur very quickly. This is illustrated in Figure 1, by the line labeled reactive strategy.
Cooperating after observing a defection should also be suboptimal. Choosing Y in this
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instance can delay the contagion but cannot stop it. To see why, suppose a player observes Z. If
he meets a cooperator in the next period, then choosing Y produces a current loss to the player
because he earns y (instead of h). If he meets a deviator, choosing Y also causes a current loss
because he earns l rather than z. Hence, the player must be sufficiently impatient to prefer play of
Z to Y. The smaller are l and y, the greater is the incentive to play Z. Our parameterization
ensures this incentive exists for all δ ∈ (0, 1) so it is optimal to play Z after observing (or

selecting) Z.
Assuming a homogenous population in our experimental economies, the preceding
discussion has two immediate predictions, which are put forward below.
Proposition 2. In our experimental economies with private monitoring, the efficient outcome can
be sustained as an equilibrium.

Proposition 2 follows directly from Proposition 1. For the efficient outcome to be feasible, we
need δ ≥ δ * . In our experimental design δ = 0.95 and δ * = 0.443 , a value that solves the
condition in Proposition 1 for the parameterization given in Table 2B. 11
Proposition 3. In our experimental economies with private monitoring, the use of personal
punishment is neither necessary nor sufficient to sustain the efficient outcome as an equilibrium.

Recall that with personal punishment an agent has the option, at a cost, to lower the current
earnings of his opponent only after observing the outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma. To sustain
the efficient outcome in private monitoring, subjects can use a grim trigger strategy, hence the
use of personal punishment is theoretically not necessary. In a one-shot interaction, choosing
11

Contagion equilibria as in Kandori (1992) are not robust to adding a small amount of noise in the observation of
individual behavior. With noise, equilibria arise similar to those in the continuum limit where individual behavior is
unobservable (e.g., see David K. Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995). One can suppose that the larger the
population, the greater the instances of noise in observability. To lessen such instances in our experimental study,
we work with four-agent economies, the smallest possible number that allow pairwise anonymous matching.

15

personal punishment is a dominated action because it is costly for the punisher. Given indefinite
repetition, personal punishment in our design is not a credible threat and cannot be part of any
sequential equilibrium, on or off the equilibrium path. Personal punishment is not an optimal
strategy for two reasons. First, it does not trigger a faster contagion to the state of economy-wide
defection. In our design agents are anonymous, randomly matched in each period, and can only
observe actions and outcomes in their pair. Hence, to someone outside the match, a choice of
personal punishment is no more visible than a choice of defection. Because of private
monitoring, personal punishment is no more “efficient” than a grim trigger defection strategy,
and in addition, it is costly.
Second, personal punishment is not theoretically sufficient to sustain the efficient outcome
because the threat of personal punishment alone cannot sustain cooperation, even with public
monitoring. The reason is that personal punishment is not a credible threat because after
observing a defection, it is never individually optimal to pay the cost for personal punishment.
On the contrary, defecting after having observed a defection is an optimal strategy. For instance,
a strategy where agents always cooperate and respond to a defection only with personal
punishment for the period cannot sustain cooperation. After the opponent defects, an agent has
no incentive to inflict personal punishment because it simply adds a further loss. Moreover, the
incentive to defect in following periods remains because defection is the unique best response in
the one-shot game. In conclusion, though personal punishment is a big enough threat to sustain
cooperation, it is not a credible one.
III.C. Equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated game with public monitoring
In this section we specify that the efficient outcome can also be sustained as a sequential
equilibrium in the treatments in which the history of actions taken in the economy is public
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information. Of course, with more information the possible strategies that sustain the efficient
outcome are expanded.
Proposition 4. In our experimental economies with public monitoring the efficient outcome can
be sustained as an equilibrium.
When we allow for public monitoring, instead, the value of δ* can only fall. It is now 0.25 since
according to the grim trigger strategy, a current defection implies a sure defection by any future
partner. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the line denoted global strategy, representing a grim
trigger strategy in which permanent defection occurs as soon as a defection is detected anywhere
in the economy (in or outside the pair).
The important aspect of public monitoring is that giving more information about actions is
beneficial to cooperators in several different respects. First, a player who observes a deviation
might have the option to defect in the future only with a subset of players (for instance, those
known to have deviated). This can only increase the frequency of cooperation in the economy
because it allows players to cooperate with those known to cooperate. Second, if players
cooperate with those known to have cooperated in the past, then, loosely speaking, a player is
less likely to experience a defection as a result of a past defection by someone else. In addition,
more information is detrimental to deviators, since they can be targeted more effectively. All of
these elements serve to increase the payoff for a cooperator and decrease it for a deviator, off the
equilibrium path, which generates incentives to cooperate for even lower discount factors.
Below we identify three broad classes of strategies. First, players could switch from a
cooperative mode to a punishment mode when they observe a defection, no matter if coming
from an opponent or someone else in the economy. We have already called it a global strategy.
Second, players could switch to a punishment mode when they observe an opponent defect, but
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stay in a cooperative mode if a defection is observed elsewhere in the economy, what we refer to
as a reactive strategy. Third, an even more selective strategy would involve a player switching to
a punishment mode after observing an opponent defect, limiting defections only to future
encounters with the same opponent, while staying in a cooperative mode with anyone else. We
refer to this as a targeted strategy, because the subject punishes only those who have defected in
a match with her. It is easily demonstrated that, with a targeted strategy, the efficient outcome is
optimal as long as δ is greater than 0.5. Of course, these three classes of strategies do not exhaust
all possible behaviors; for instance, players can punish anyone who has ever defected. However,
they are indicative of three intuitive ways of behaving and, as we will see, can explain a great
deal of subjects’ behavior.
In random matching with non-anonymous public monitoring all classes of strategies are
available. On the contrary, with private monitoring reactive strategies are available, but global
and targeted strategies are not. Hence, variations in cooperation level between treatments could
suggest what class of strategies—global, reactive, targeted (or something else that we do not
characterize)—enhances cooperation (see Table 1).
One can classify strategies also using “power” and “selectivity” scores. The power of a
strategy is the maximum loss that can be inflicted on a defector, which depends on the
immediacy and frequency of punishment. The greater the power, the lower is the defector’s
continuation payoff, and the greater is the incentive to cooperate. Among the three strategies
considered, global strategies have the most power as they provide the largest possible threat:
everyone defects right after a deviation (Figure 1). Targeted strategies have the least power.12 A
strategy’s selectivity depends on who gets punished. Targeted strategies are the most selective
12

For example, with public monitoring, the lower bound for δ falls by about 40 percent when we move from a
reactive to a global strategy and by about 50 percent when we move from a targeted to a global strategy.
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and imply the lowest cost of punishment: only opponents who defected are punished.

IV. Results
We first present results on the aggregate outcome (Results 1-5) and then on the strategies
employed to sustain those outcomes (Results 6-10).
Result 1. In economies with private monitoring, cooperation emerged and was higher in later
cycles than in earlier cycles.
Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) proved the theoretical possibility of cooperation with
private monitoring. In our data the rate of (coordination on) cooperation was remarkably high,
59.5 percent when averaging across all periods (Figure 2). In addition, the data displays an
increasing cooperation trend across cycles (Figure 3). Both aspects are novel.
Consider an economy k=1,..,50 as a unit of observation. For an economy k we define the
action aitk of an agent i=1,..,4 in period t=1,..,Tk of the economy as an element aitk∈{0,1}≡{Z, Y}.
A cooperative action is coded as 1, and a defection is coded as 0. Therefore, the average
cooperation in an economy k is
(3)

and across economies is c =

ck =

1
4T k

Tk

4

∑∑ a
t =1 i =1

it

k

,

1 50
ck . Thus, although economies have different length Tk, they
∑
50 k =1

are given equal weight in our measure c of average cooperation, since we consider each economy
a unit of observation.
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Figure 2: Average cooperation across treatments13
It is instructive to compare our results to those from related experiments with a random
matching protocol. Duffy and Ochs (2006) report a low average rate of cooperation of 6.3
percent and, most importantly, a declining trend across supergames; cooperation declined from
8.7 to 3.9 percent (first half of the sessions). Schwartz, Young and Zvinakis (2000) report a 19.2
percent cooperation rate and also a declining trend across supergames from 25.1 percent (cycles
1-2) to 10.8 percent (cycles 5-7). Trends are important because they point to a direction of
learning. In our study, instead, cooperation in the first two cycles was 55.2 percent and grew to
66.5 percent in the last two cycles. Why do we see these differences? In all these experimental
designs the incentives satisfy the necessary conditions to support full-cooperation as a theoretical
equilibrium. However, such incentives are not theoretically sufficient to achieve full cooperation
because subjects may coordinate on a less efficient equilibrium outcome. Behavioral components

13

We aggregated economies from all cycles by treatment and carried out Mann-Whitney tests of pairwise
differences in cooperation between treatments. Differences are statistically significant at 1 percent level with two
exceptions: private monitoring vs. anonymous public monitoring and private monitoring with punishment vs. nonanonymous public monitoring. One economy is one observation; in each comparison n1=n2=50.
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may thus influence the outcome. In particular, three elements may generate lower cooperation
rates in Duffy and Ochs (2006) than in our experiment: their stage game payoffs reward
cooperation less (l=0, h=30, y=10, z=20); they have lower continuation probability (0.90 vs.
0.95); and they have larger group sizes (6-14 vs. 4). All these features generate stronger
incentives towards cooperation in our design.14 Consequently, we surmise that both our as well
as the other related studies point to some missing elements in the theory of social norms. To
assess the impact of the economy size with private monitoring we ran four additional sessions
with economies of 14 subjects interacting for one cycle. Average cooperation was 23.6 percent,
which is in line with previous studies.15A systematic exploration of the behavioral conditions for
the breaking down of cooperation with a random matching protocol is left to future work.

Fraction of cooperative actions

100%

80%

60%

40%

Private Monitoring
Anonymous Public Monitoring

20%

Private Monitoring With Punishment
Non-anonymous Public Monitoring

0%
cycle 1

cycle 2

cycle 3

cycle 4

cycle 5

Figure 3: Average cooperation across cycles

14

Similar considerations hold for the design in Schwartz, Young and Zvinakis (2000). In their stage game subjects
first chose between a safe, outside option of 60 or to play a prisoner’s dilemma (l=10, h=170, y=120, z=60). The
continuation probability was about 0.89 and economy sizes 10-14.
15
Period 1 cooperation was 55.3 percent versus 42.9 percent in Duffy and Ochs (2006) in a comparable treatment
(Random I=0).
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More generally, the literature reports increasing cooperation rates over cycles in indefinitely
repeated experiments among partners (Aoyagi and Frechette, 2005; Dal Bó and Frechette, 2006;
Duffy and Ochs, 2006). Instead, results are sharply different than in finitely repeated prisoners’
dilemmas and voluntary public good experiments, where cooperation is generally declining over
time (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1994).
Result 2. In the anonymous treatments, the introduction of public monitoring did not improve
cooperation over private monitoring.
Subjects in public monitoring possess information about the choices of others that is
unavailable in private monitoring. Figure 2 shows that if this information is anonymous, then it
does not foster cooperation. Average cooperation for all periods is around 59 percent in both
treatments; the difference is statistically insignificant (Mann-Whitney test, p-value 0.418,
n1=n2=50). If we consider average cooperation in first periods only, then we reach the same
conclusion (see Table 3). Considering first-period choices of an economy is important because
they supply a complementary measure of cooperation, which is independent from the choices of
other subjects in the economy. In particular, as is shown later, first-period behavior suggests
whether some equilibrium among the many possible had a particularly strong drawing power.
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Number of cooperative
Actions

Private
monitoring
73.5

4
3
2
1
0

36
30
28
4
2

2
1
0

58
31
11

Anonymous public
Private monitoring
Public monitoring
monitoring
with punishment
(non-anonymous)
Average cooperation (percentages)
70.5
84.5
87.0
Frequency of cooperation in an economy (percentages)
26
50
54
42
38
40
22
12
6
8
0
0
2
0
0
Frequency of cooperation in a match (percentages)
51
71
75
39
27
24
10
2
1

Table 3: Cooperation in the first period of an economy16

Result 3. The introduction of personal punishment in the anonymous treatments increased both
cooperation and realized efficiency.
Figures 2 and Table 3 provide support for Result 3. When we add personal punishment to
economies with private monitoring, average cooperation jumps from 59.5 to 74.2 percent. This
difference is statistically significant at a 1 percent level (Mann-Whitney test, p-value 0.007). This
difference is also evident when comparing average cooperation in the first period of each cycle
(73.5 vs. 84.5 percent, Table 3). As shown in Result 4, average cooperation is statistically
indistinguishable from the non-anonymous public monitoring treatment (Mann-Whitney test, pvalue 0.154). The observed pattern of high cooperation in the first period not only is an indicator
of subjects’ preferences for the efficient outcome, but it also suggests that subjects might have
anticipated that the efficient outcome would be enforced by personal punishment. This
anticipation was correct because, as shown in Result 7, personal punishment was indeed
administered to defectors.

16

In each treatment the number of observations is 50 for “average” and “frequency of cooperation in an economy”
and 100 for “frequency of cooperation in a match.”

23

The comparison among treatments in terms of realized efficiency substantially confirms the
conclusions drawn in Results 1-5, in terms of average cooperation. Ranking among treatments
may have been different because personal punishment is a deadweight loss. We define realized
efficiency in an economy k by
1
ek = k
4T

(4)

Tk

4

π it k − 10

∑∑ 25 − 10
t =1 i =1

The payoff to subject i, in economy k, of period t is denoted π it k (and given in Table 2). The
denominator reports the average payoff in a match, which ranges from a minimum of 10 to a
maximum of 25 points. Realized efficiency ek ranges from 0 to 1. In particular, ek=0 when
everyone in the economy always defects and ek=1 when everyone in the economy always
cooperates. With personal punishment realized efficiency can be negative, with a minimum of −1
when everyone always defects and always punishes. Only 2 out 50 economies had a negative
realized efficiency (the minimum was ek = −0.074). Average realized efficiencies ek for the four
treatments in the experiment were 0.595, 0.586, 0.652, and 0.815 (ordering as in Table 3). Given
that private monitoring with punishment displayed average cooperation levels comparable to
non-anonymous public monitoring (Table 3, footnote 18), the difference in efficiency between
these two treatments originates from the deadweight loss due to personal punishment.
Result 4. The introduction of public monitoring in the non-anonymous treatment increased
cooperation over private monitoring.
Figure 2 and Table 3 provide support for Result 4. In the non-anonymous public monitoring
treatment average cooperation across economies was 81.5 percent. A Mann-Whitney test
conducted on cooperation in non-anonymous public monitoring shows significant difference
with private monitoring (59.5 percent, p-value 0.0001, N1= N2=50) and with anonymous public
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monitoring (58.6 percent, p-value 0.0000).17 Result 4 is consistent with data reported in the
literature of high levels of cooperation in the partner treatment. Similar to a partner design,
participants interact in pairs and know the whole individual history of interaction, but unlike it,
the match for the period is randomly picked from a group of three other individuals.
We also analyzed the distribution of average cooperation levels across the fifty economies.18
About 38 percent of the economies have cooperation rates above 98 percent. The superiority of
non-anonymous public monitoring is clear also from the average cooperation in the initial period
across economies, as shown in Table 3. In this treatment the full past record of the opponent is
available, hence each participant could develop a reputation over time, which, as will be shown
in Result 9, was the key to the observed success in coordinating on the fully efficient
equilibrium.
The remaining results report about the strategies adopted by the representative subject by
considering three elements: (1) how subjects played the first period of each cycle, (2) how
subjects reacted after seeing a defection, and (3) whether, after seeing a defection, subjects
eventually reverted to cooperation. This allows us to establish the empirical relevance of several
available strategies, which may or may not be consistent with equilibrium.
Results 5. In all treatments, period 1 cooperation was significantly different than zero. Hence,
there is no evidence of coordination on the inefficient outcome.
Table 3 provides evidence for Result 5. As noted earlier, choices in the first period of each
economy suggest whether some equilibrium among the many possible had a particularly strong
17

The unit of analysis used in all tests is an economy. Strictly speaking, all observations are independent only if we
focus on the first cycle. The results of the test rely on all observations being independent.
18
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-tail two-sample tests on distributions confirm results from the Mann-Whitney tests on
the differences between averages. On one hand private monitoring and anonymous public monitoring are not
statistically different treatments (10 percent confidence level, n1=n2=50). On the other hand, private monitoring with
punishment and non-anonymous public monitoring are not statistically different either. Instead, treatments from the
two groups are statistically different at least at a 5 percent level.
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drawing power. One can examine how subjects coordinated in the initial period by looking either
at agreement of choices in the economy or in the pairwise match; see Table 3. Either way, we
can rule out that subjects attempted to coordinate on defection. In particular, at least half of the
economies started with full cooperation in two treatments, public monitoring (non-anonymous)
and private monitoring with punishment. If we consider matches as the relevant unit of
observation, in period 1 both subjects cooperated in more than 50 percent of the matches in every
treatment.19 Furthermore, Table 5 includes an analysis of coordination on cooperation to all
periods. Coordination on cooperation in an economy ranges from 28 percent in private
monitoring to 50 percent in private monitoring with punishment.

Table 4: Probit regression on individual choice to cooperate – marginal effects20
Dependent variable:
1=cooperation
0=defection
Treatment dummies:
Anonymous Public
Monitoring
Private Monitoring
With punishment
Public Monitoring
(non-anonymous)
Cycle dummies:
Cycle 2
Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5

Private
Monitoring

0.039
(0.104)
0.076
(0.069)
0.136***
(0.008)
-0.160***

Anonymous
Public
Monitoring

0.057
(0.038)
0.050
(0.051)
0.188***
(0.025)
0.290***

Private
Monitoring
With
punishment

0.083***
(0.026)
0.111***
(0.020)
0.149***
(0.030)
0.139***

Public
Monitoring
(nonanonymous)

-0.003*
(0.002)
0.020***
(0.002)
0.126***
(0.027)
0.139***

All
treatments

All
treatments,
first periods
only

-0.046*
(0.024)
0.998***
(0.000)
0.947***
(0.009)

-0.029
(0.073)
0.092
(0.067)
0.117*
(0.061)

0.062***
(0.023)
0.093***
(0.027)
0.174***
(0.022)
0.214***

-0.037
(0.028)
0.006
(0.029)
0.049
(0.035)
0.082***

19

Of course, there is variation in subjects’ period one behavior. Consider all cycles; the variance of average
cooperation across all subjects is 0.136, 0.117, 0.056, and 0.059 (treatments ordered as in Table 3). The percentages
of subjects who cooperated in period one of all cycles are 44, 36, 46, and 52, respectively.
20
Marginal effects are computed at the mean value of regressors. Robust standard errors for the marginal effects are
in parentheses computed with a cluster on each session; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; ***
significant at 1 percent. For a continuous variable the marginal effect measures the change in the likelihood to
cooperate for an infinitesimal change of the independent variable. For a dummy variable the marginal effect
measures the change in the likelihood to cooperate for a discrete change of the dummy variable. First periods of
each cycle are excluded (except the last column). Individual fixed effects and period fixed effects are included
(except in the last column) but not reported in the table (individual dummies: s2-s30 s32-s37 s39 s41-s60 s62-s97
s99-s159; period dummies: 3, 4, 5, 6-10, 11-20, 21-30, >30). Duration of previous cycle was set to 20 for cycle 1.
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Duration of previous
cycle
Reactive strategies:
Grim trigger
lag 1
lag 2
lag 3
lag 4
lag 5

(0.043)
0.001*
(0.001)

(0.032)
0.003***
(0.000)

(0.033)
0.002***
(0.000)

(0.004)
0.004***
(0.001)

(0.021)
0.004***
(0.001)

-0.550***
(0.014)
0.088**
(0.043)
0.116***
(0.036)
0.103**
(0.042)
0.080**
(0.005)
0.030**
(0.014)

-0.266***
(0.074)
-0.048**
(0.024)
-0.095***
(0.018)
-0.073*
(0.042)
-0.058
(0.047)
-0.071***
(0.014)

-0.382***
(0.100)
0.056*
(0.030)
0.046*
(0.027)
0.040
(0.034)
0.0152
(0.045)
0.014
(0.030)

0.075
(0.055)
-0.061
(0.039)
-0.140***
(0.031)
-0.063***
(0.007)
-0.053
(0.060)
-0.018
(0.041)

-.388***
(0.041)
0.018
(0.027)
-0.027
(0.039)
-0.010
(0.027)
-0.033
(0.029)
-0.044*
(0.023)

Global strategies:
Grim trigger

-0.311**
(0.131)
0.227***
(0.016)
0.229***
(0.063)
0.243***
(0.010)
0.175***
(0.031)
0.155***
(0.012)

lag 1
lag 2
lag 3
lag 4
lag 5

-0.116***
(0.002)
0.023
(0.059)
0.028
(0.043)
0.048**
(0.024)
0.005
(0.021)
-0.032
(0.054)

Targeted strategies:
Grim trigger

-0.363***
(0.047)
-0.044***
(0.005)
-0.057***
(0.014)
-0.018
(0.033)
-0.043***
(0.003)
-0.063***
(0.016)

lag 1
lag 2
lag 3
lag 4
lag 5
Personal punishment
Requested (lag)

-0.076
(0.085)
0.028

Requested (lag)
× opponent
defected (lag)

(0.029)
0.067*
(0.038)
-0.329***

Received (lag)
Received (lag)
× subject defected
(lag)
Observations

(0.031)
0.003***
(0.001)

3320

4880

(0.097)
4400

4280

16680

800
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Result 6. In the private monitoring treatment, the representative subject who observed her
opponent defect switched from a cooperative mode to a punishment mode. Hence, there is
evidence of use of reactive strategies.
Table 4 and Figure 4 provide support for Result 6. Recall that a reactive strategy involves a
shift to a punishment mode following a defection of the opponent. A grim trigger strategy lies in
this class and can theoretically sustain an equilibrium with full cooperation in our setting.
Table 4 reports the results from a probit regression that explains the individual choice to
cooperate (1) or not (0) using two groups of regressors. First, we introduce several dummy
variables that control for fixed effect (cycles, periods within the cycle, individuals), as well as for
the duration of the previous cycle. Second, we include a set of regressors used to trace the
response of the representative subject in the periods following an observed defection. For
simplicity, we limit our focus to the five periods following an observed defection. This
specification is more general than tracing behavior in periods 1-5 only, and it allows us to shed
light on the type of strategy employed by the representative subject. Of course, there are several
ways to choose regressors in order to trace strategies. Our specification has the advantage to
detect whether subjects followed theoretically well-known strategies, such as grim trigger or titfor-tat (Robert Axelrod, 1984). Indeed, we include a “grim trigger” regressor, which has a value
of 1 in all periods following an observed defection and 0 otherwise. We also include five “lag”
regressors, which have a value of 1 only in one period following an observed defection and 0
otherwise. For example, the “lag 1” regressor takes value 1 exclusively in the period after the
defection (0 otherwise). The “lag 2” regressor takes value 1 exclusively in the second period
following a defection (0 otherwise). And so on.
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20%
Change in fraction of cooperative actions

Private Monitoring - Reactive
Private Monitoring With Punishment - Reactive

0%

-20%

-40%

-60%
0

1

2

3

4

5

any
more
than 5

Period lag between observed defection and choice

Figure 4: Strategies of the representative subject in private monitoring with and without personal
punishment
If the representative subject switched from a cooperative to a punishment mode after seeing a
defection, then the estimated coefficient of at least one of the six strategy regressors should be
negative. For example, if subjects punished for just two periods following a defection, then the
sum of the estimated coefficients of the grim trigger regressor and the lag regressors should be
negative for the first and second period following a defection, and zero afterwards.
Figure 4 illustrates the marginal effect on the frequency of cooperation in the periods that
followed an observed defection.21 The focus on the five-period lags is for convenience in

21

Figure 4 is based on Table 4 using the coefficient estimates coding for reactive strategies. Zero-period lag is
exogenously set at 0 percent. The point for “any more than 5” is the marginal effect on the frequency of cooperation
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showing patterns in the results. The representation for “any more than five” period lags is based
on the marginal effect of the grim trigger regressor only. The representation for period lags 1
though 5 is based on the sum of the marginal effects of the grim trigger regressor and the lag
regressor with the appropriate lag. The L-shaped pattern of response to an observed defection
suggests a persistent downward shift in cooperation levels immediately after a defection. The
grim trigger coefficient estimate is significantly different than zero at a 1 percent level. All other
strategy regressors are significant at 10 percent level or more (Table 4).22 While there is evidence
that the representative subject employed a reactive strategy, not all observed actions fit this type
of strategy. Indeed, the transitional matrices displayed in Table 5A indicate that about 40 percent
of individual actions are not compatible with reactive strategies.

of the grim trigger regressor. Lags 1 through 5 are the sum of two marginal effects on the frequency of cooperation,
the effect of the grim trigger regressor plus the proper lag regressor (i.e. coding reaction one period after the
observed defection for period 1, coding reaction two periods after the observed defection for period 2, etc.).
Marginal effects for the lag regressors are computed for grim trigger regressor set at 1 (i.e. defection)
22
Table 4 reports that the actual length of the previous cycle influenced the propensity of participants to
cooperate—the longer the previous cycle, the higher the current cooperation level. This confirms the finding
reported in Aoyagi and Frechette (2005) and Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004).
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A - Private Monitoring
No. cooperative
actions in the
current period
0
1
2
3
4

C - Private Monitoring with Punishment

No.cooperative actions in next period
0
1
2
3
4 totals
(percentages)
10 4#
#
#
#
14
4 9# 3#
#
#
16
1 4# 15
3#
#
23
#
#
5 11# 3#
19
#
#
#
3# 24
28
100

No.cooperative actions in next period
0
1
2
3
4 totals
(percentages)
8 3#
#
#
#
10
3 5# 2#
1#
#
10
1 3#
5
3# 1#
12
# 1#
4
10# 3#
17
#
#
#
3# 46
50
100

B - Anonymous Public Monitoring D - Non-Anonymous Public Monitoring
No. cooperative
actions in the
current period
0
1
2
3
4

No.cooperative actions in next period
0
1
2
3
4 totals
(percentages)
7
4
1
13
5
9
4
1
19
1
5
8
3
17
1
4
10
4
19
4
28
32
100

No.cooperative actions in next period
0 1
2
3
4 totals
(percentages)
1 1
1
3
1 1
2
1
5
1 2
13
7
3
25
1
8
11
5
26
3
5
33
41
100

Note: When everyone uses only reactive strategies (grim trigger) the cells with the # sign should be empty. A blank
cell indicates no observation or a frequency below 0.5 per cent. Frequencies are rounded to the nearest integer
percentage point. All periods included except the last one of each cycle. No. of observations is 3320 (A), 4400 (B),
4880 (C), and 4080 (D).

Table 5: Transitional matrices in an economy

Result 7. In the private monitoring with punishment treatment, the representative subject who
observed her opponent defect sometimes employed personal punishment while staying in a
cooperative mode.
Tables 4-7 along with Figure 4 provide support for Result 7. The L-shaped pattern of
response to an observed defection in Figure 4 (lighter line) suggests a persistent downward shift
in cooperation levels immediately after a defection. The estimated coefficient for the grim trigger
regressor is significant at a 1 percent level (Table 4).
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As already noted, for our parameterization the addition of personal punishment does not
expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. However—in contrast to the private monitoring
treatment without punishment (Result 6)—we do find behavioral differences. First, the
magnitude of the downward shift in cooperation levels is now substantially smaller (compare the
darker and lighter lines in Figure 4). Second, subjects employed personal punishment in 9.1
percent of the matches. In particular, Table 6 shows that personal punishment was mostly used
by cooperators against an opponent who defected. In about 58 percent of such cooperatordefector encounters, the cooperator requested that personal punishment be inflicted on the
opponent.
Action of opponent receiving punishment
(percentages)
Cooperate
Defect
Action of subject requesting Cooperate
0.1
58.3
punishment
Defect
5.4
10.4

Table 6: Frequency of personal punishment23
These two changes in observed behavior are correlated. When observing a defection, subjects
at times switched from a cooperative mode to a punishment mode. However, subjects often
continued cooperating but sanctioned through personal punishment. That is, subjects sometimes
treated personal punishment as a substitute for informal punishment, i.e., defecting in following
periods. Table 7A supports this interpretation. In particular, a cooperator encountering a defector
subsequently cooperated 75.5 percent of the times if she requested personal punishment, but only
46.7 percent of the times, if she did not punish the defector. Reversing the viewpoint, Table 7B
suggests that a defector who had been punished by a cooperator was more likely to cooperate in
the following period (34.5 vs. 24.1 percent). Once we control for all other factors, however, the
23

Each cell indicates the frequency of personal punishment inflicted on the opponent conditional on the outcome in
the match in stage one (there are four possible outcomes). The outcome (Cooperate, Defect) occurred 509 times.
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evidence on this point is mixed (Table 4). Personal punishment seems to boost cooperation levels
only in small part by deterring defection and in large part by avoiding that cooperators switch to
defection after punishing. This finding is interesting because the existing literature mostly places
emphasis on the former aspect, though recent studies on peer punishment find the latter aspect is
very important, even in finitely repeated interaction (Marco Casari and Luigi Luini, 2007).
(A) Choice after a subject cooperated
and the opponent defected
Subject choice in the
following period
Did the subject
(percentages)
request personal
punishment?
Cooperate
Defect
Yes
75.5
24.5
No
46.7
53.3

(B) Choice after a subject defected
and the opponent cooperated
Subject choice in the
following period
Did the subject
(percentages)
receive personal
punishment?
Cooperate
Defect
Yes
34.5
65.5
No
24.1
75.9

Table 7: Transitional matrices in private monitoring with punishment
To interpret Result 7, recall that our theoretical framework presumes a homogeneous
population, as in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). Within this framework, the observed
punishment behavior seems at odds with equilibrium predictions. Subjects should theoretically
achieve cooperation only by threatening and eventually triggering to permanent defection. In
finitely repeated experiments, subjects employ personal punishment for behavioral reasons–for
instance distributional justice or revenge–and for lack of any alternative equilibrium punishment
strategy (Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992, Casari and Luini, 2007). In our study, instead,
subjects show a preference for personal punishment over (equilibrium) informal punishment
schemes. This gives even stronger support to the notion of the usefulness of personal punishment
in sustaining cooperation. In the concluding section of the paper we will put forward various
conjectures to explain this behavior.
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To complement the evidence for Result 7 we calculated individual average profit and
punishment points given (data not reported). When considering the individual averages within a
cycle, greater profits are associated to less punishment being given. However, there is significant
variability in punishment: subjects with the lowest average profit tend to punish more, but not all
of them engage in punishing. Thus, costly personal punishment seems to be a public good. On
the one hand it significantly increases cooperation as well as realized efficiency (Result 3). On
the other hand the subjects who benefit the most are cooperators who punish little or not at all.
Result 8. In the anonymous public monitoring treatment, the representative subject selected
reactive strategies over global strategies.
In anonymous public monitoring subjects observed whether a defection had occurred in the
match or elsewhere in the economy. In the experiment, a defection by an opponent generated a
stronger response than a defection elsewhere in the economy. This conclusion is based on the
estimated coefficients for reactive and global strategies. Both strategies were available in the
anonymous public monitoring treatment (Table 4, Figure 5). A subject using a reactive strategy
punished everyone after seeing a defection in the match, but kept cooperating after seeing a
defection outside the match. In contrast a subject using a global strategy started punishing
everyone after observing a defection, no matter if it came from an opponent or someone else.
Figure 5 is based on the marginal effects estimated using regressions in Table 4.24 In addition
to what has been explained after Result 6, the probit regression for anonymous public monitoring
includes six additional strategy regressors, which are used to trace global strategies. The
representative subject who experienced a defection displayed a strong and persistent decrease in

24

Figure 5 uses the coefficient estimates coding reactive and global strategies, respectively. Marginal effects for the
reactive strategies were computed for the average values of global strategies regressors. Marginal effects for the
global strategies were computed for the average values of reactive strategies regressors.

34

future cooperation levels (reactive strategy: solid line in Figure 5). Conversely, the response was
much weaker when the representative subject observed a defection outside her match (global
strategy: dashed line in Figure 5).
20%

Change in fraction of cooperative actions

Anonymous Public Monitoring - Reactive
Anonymous Public Monitoring - Global
0%

-20%

-40%

-60%
0

1

2

3

4

5

any more
than 5

Period lag between observed defection and choice

Figure 5: Strategies of the representative subject in anonymous public monitoring25
Result 9. In the non-anonymous public monitoring treatment, the representative subject selected
targeted strategies over reactive and global strategies.
In non-anonymous public monitoring subjects observed all individual histories. In the
experiment, a defection by an opponent generated a strong response in future encounters with the

25

The two lines overlap for periods “any more than 5” because of how reactive and global strategy regressors are
defined (see Figure 1).
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same opponent. However, defections outside the match were largely ignored. This conclusion is
based on the estimated coefficients for targeted, reactive and global strategies. These three
strategies were all available with non-anonymous public monitoring (Table 4 and Figure 6).
Recall that a subject using a targeted strategy punished only opponents who defected in previous
encounters but cooperated with everyone else, even if they defected with someone else.

Non-anonymous Public Monitoring - Targeted

20%

Non-anonymous Public Monitoring - Reactive

Change in fraction of cooperative actions

Non-anonymous Public Monitoring - Global

0%

-20%

-40%

-60%
0

1

2

3

4

5

any more
than 5

Period lag between observed defection and choice

Figure 6: Strategies of the representative subject in non-anonymous public monitoring
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Figure 6 reports the marginal effects estimated using regressions in Table 4.26 In addition to
what has already been discussed in relation to Figures 4 and 5, the (cooperation) choices for nonanonymous public monitoring include six additional strategy regressors, which we used to trace
targeted strategies. Figure 6 is interpreted as follows. The dark solid line indicates that a subject
who experienced a defection displayed a strong and persistent decrease in cooperation levels
when future encounters involved the same opponent. In contrast, the light solid and the dashed
lines in Figure 6 reveal that there is little support for the use of either reactive or global
strategies. We draw the following lesson: individual-specific information appears to be much
more effective than aggregate information in promoting cooperation.
Result 10. In all treatments a defection of an opponent triggered a persistent decrease in
cooperation, and the representative subject did not revert to a cooperative mode.
While in private monitoring treatments, cooperation could be supported only through grim
trigger strategies; in public monitoring treatments cooperation could also be supported through
T-period trigger strategies.27 Regression results from Table 4 allow us to detect if such type of
strategies were actually employed. In all treatments, including economies with public
monitoring, the defection of an opponent triggered a persistent decrease in cooperation with very
little reversion to a cooperative mode. If the representative subject employed a T-period trigger
strategy, one should detect a U-shape pattern and not an L-shape pattern in the marginal effect

26

Figure 6 uses the coefficient estimates coding targeted, reactive and global strategies, respectively. Marginal
effects for targeted strategies were computed for the average values of reactive and global strategies regressors.
Marginal effects for reactive strategies were computed for the average values of targeted and global strategies
regressors. Marginal effects for global strategies were computed for the average values of targeted and reactive
strategies regressors.
27
At the end of each period, everyone observes the same random draw concerning the continuation of the cycle. So,
subjects could coordinate a reversion to cooperation using that random draw, even with private monitoring.

37

curves of Figures 4-6. Instead, after an initial drop, the curves look generally flat, and no
recovery to pre-defection cooperation levels after five periods can be detected.28

V. Final Remarks
We studied long-run equilibria in experimental economies composed by strangers who play
indefinitely a prisoners’ dilemma in pairs. Subjects are randomly matched and cannot directly
communicate, and their identities and histories are private information. Achieving cooperation in
this setting is difficult because subjects can neither commit to cooperation nor enforce it,
especially because opponents vary randomly over time. Contrary to our expectations, we found
that subjects did overcome these hurdles and cooperated at high and increasing rates (private
monitoring treatment). We find that strangers can achieve remarkably high rates of cooperation
in small economies, and cooperation increases with experience. This empirical finding is novel.
The theoretical work of Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) ensures that full cooperation is an
equilibrium in our experimental design, but previous studies of similar indefinitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemmas report that subjects selected a different equilibrium. Yet, our experimental
results suggest that these theories of cooperation among strangers seem to lack some
fundamental element to describe human behavior, because subjects appear to strongly focus over
some classes of the strategies to support the cooperative equilibrium.
We have built on this initial finding by studying if and how the introduction of some
prototypical institutions, capable of reducing either informational or enforcement frictions,
would impact the emergence of cooperation (private monitoring with punishment, anonymous
public monitoring, non-anonymous public monitoring treatments). According to theory, none of
28

Wald tests reveal lag regressors are often jointly significant at 5 percent level (except in private monitoring with
punishment, and global strategies in non-anonymous public monitoring), which suggests the use of other strategies
in addition to a permanent punishment. We did not expand on this because their magnitude is small.
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these institutions alters the lower or upper bound of cooperation possible in equilibrium. Yet,
they had a remarkable impact on cooperation levels observed in the experiment.
In some treatments we increased the available information by displaying the histories of
actions of everyone in the economy (public monitoring). Such information sometimes had no
effect on aggregate cooperation levels and sometimes had startling effects. Unless histories could
be traced back to a specific individual, then this additional information was not used. In the
anonymous public monitoring treatment, subjects received aggregate information about histories
in the economy but failed to exploit the information to increase cooperation above the private
monitoring treatment. Instead, cooperation was considerably higher when details about identities
were added to this aggregate information (non-anonymous public monitoring). The lesson that
we draw is that information must be linked to a particular individual, in order to have an effect
on cooperation. This result suggests that reputation-tracking institutions, such as personal credit
history in financial markets, play an important role in sustaining compliance without relying
frequently or exclusively on costly enforcement institutions, such as courts of law. Second, in
some treatments subjects had the costly option to lower the opponent’s payoff. In this personal
punishment treatment cooperation levels increased so dramatically that they are statistically
indistinguishable from the non-anonymous public monitoring treatment. However, it is important
to realize that though adding either individual histories or personal punishment increased
cooperation to similar levels, the use of personal punishment generates a deadweight loss.
Another main contribution of the paper is to shed light on the classes of strategies employed
by subjects who indefinitely play a prisoners’ dilemma. The subjects’ behavior in our
experimental economies suggests a strong focus on strategies that are selective in punishment
(i.e., strategies that narrow down the sets of targets of punishment). Indeed, when strategies with
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different levels of selectivity were available, subjects invariably chose the one with the most
selective punishment. For example, when subjects remained anonymous but could see all
histories in the economy, the representative subject mostly defected only after having directly
experienced a defection (reactive strategy). When subjects could also see individual identities,
then the representative subject essentially targeted her punishment toward those who directly
cheated her in previous encounters, but cooperated with everyone else. This is remarkable
because the power of a targeted strategy (punish the culprit only) is lower than that of a global
strategy (punish everyone as soon as one sees a defection); the latter strategy immediately
triggers an economy-wide defection, and as a result incorporates a bigger threat, which of course
comes at a higher efficiency cost.29 In fact our data suggest that the threat of economy-wide
defection has low credibility. For instance, when economy-wide defection was the only available
threat to support a cooperative outcome (private monitoring treatment), we observed the lowest
levels of cooperation in all treatments in period 1. This result indicates that subjects may doubt
that a single defection will trigger an economy-wide punishment.
We put forward several possible reasons for the frequent use of some classes of strategies.
First, subjects may have other-regarding preferences. Indeed, there is an experimental literature
that validates this conjecture and several models of other-regarding preferences exist that
alternatively focus on: altruism, inequality aversion or reciprocity (see Sobel, 2005 for a review).
Subjects with a reciprocity or “punishment that fits the crime” norm, for instance, may prefer
punishment schemes that decrease the harm to cooperators while raising it for defectors. This
attitude would suggest a strong preference for targeted strategies over reactive or global
strategies, and therefore, a reluctance to engage in economy-wide defection.
29

If power is a criterion to select strategies, then in the anonymous public monitoring everyone should use a global
strategy, which is not observed. In the non-anonymous public monitoring one should observe that a defector is
punished by everyone in every future match, which is not observed.
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Second, subjects may prefer simpler strategies because of cognitive costs. The results
reported provide mixed evidence on this point. A grim-trigger reactive strategy may be the
simplest choice available because it requires knowledge of the outcome only in the current
period and only in the subject’s match. Other strategies may involve a higher cognitive cost
because they require the monitoring of identities, as when strategies are targeted, or of outcomes
in other matches. However, the economies included just four subjects, and information was
clearly displayed and easily accessible. So, one can hardly argue that monitoring identities and
histories was a demanding task. Another dimension of complexity could be time-dependence as
in t-period punishment strategies, which are not observed. In public monitoring treatments tperiod punishment strategies are feasible and deliver higher continuation payoff. Self-regarding
agents, and even more so other-regarding agents, should prefer t-period punishment to grim
trigger strategies. Yet, punishment following a defection appears to have no reversal trend (i.e.,
we see little evidence of time-dependent strategies). Although this observation may suggest that
simplicity plays a role in the selection of strategies, we also observe the use of more complex
strategies that involve several contingencies, such as targeted strategies.
The widespread use of personal punishment also deserves some discussion. Through personal
punishment, a subject can directly and immediately lower the earnings of her opponent, which is
not a best response for a self-regarding, rational agent (proposition 3). In the experiment,
however, availability of personal punishment remarkably increased aggregate cooperation from
the very first period. One can think of several reasons for the use of personal punishment. One is
reciprocity because a subject may be happy to pay a cost to lower her opponent’s earnings in
order to reciprocate for her defection. In this manner she avoids harming cooperators through
punishing only those who have been unkind. Under private monitoring, a reciprocator had no
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other equilibrium strategy with comparable selectivity in punishing defectors. In fact, subjects
using a reactive strategy must punish everyone in order to eventually punish the defector.
Another reason is simplicity because personal punishment neither requires knowledge of others’
strategies nor coordination on some informal punishment scheme.

Moreover, personal

punishment is unavoidable. When using a reactive strategy, instead, punishing by defecting is
uncertain because the interaction could suddenly end. A final reason for using personal
punishment involves using a channel of costly communication, which may have helped in
coordinating (e.g., Russell Cooper, Douglas DeJong, and Robert Forsythe, 1996, Crawford,
1998, John B. Van Huyck, John M. Wildenthal, and Raymond C. Battalio, 2002).
A tentative conclusion is that cognitive costs may play a minor role in driving strategy
choice, while other-regarding preferences may be more relevant. We plan to tackle this issue in
future work.
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